**All Strangers Together: British and French Soldiering in the Baltic During Russia's Time of Troubles, 1600-1618.**



Abstract:

This thesis looks at the experiences of English, French, Irish, and Scottish soldiers serving Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden during the Russian Time of Troubles (c. 1600-1618). The thesis is primarily concerned with capturing their lived experiences, as opposed to how the states they served employed them. Hence, the structure follows events in the order that an individual soldier would have experienced them, but drawing examples from the entire breadth of the period covered. It analyzes these experiences through the lenses of ethnicity and confession, and finds that while these were initially very important factors in determining who and with whom to serve, as time went on these soldiers broke away from those ties, and fashioned a new identity based on their mutual recognition of each other as foreigners in the Baltic.

**Preface:**

**Stanisław Żołkiewski, Foreign Soldiers, and the Battle of Klushino, 4 July 1610**

In early July 1610, the Polish Hetman Stanisław Żołkiewski had reason to worry about the progress of his campaign.[[1]](#footnote-1) The Polish-Lithuanian force under his command had been besieging the Russian town of Tsarovo Zamyestye since June 24, but now a combined Russian and Swedish force which greatly outnumbered his was coming to relieve the defenders,[[2]](#footnote-2) It seemed a desperate situation for the Polish army.

Two lucky sources of intelligence appeared on 3 July. First, a cavalry captain took prisoner a few boyars' sons who had become separated from the Russian army, and they divulged that the enemy commander was to spend the night in the nearby town of Klushino. Żołkiewski's second lucky stroke was that "5 Frenchmen and Scots also blundered into our army."[[3]](#footnote-3) They also confirmed that their army was spending the night in Klushino, and told Zolkiewski of the low morale of the foreign troops, who had not been paid in months.

The Polish-Lithuanian army met their opponents at Klushino early the next day. Zolkiewski wrote, "The battle lasted a long time, for both our men and theirs, particularly the foreigners, fought hard."[[4]](#footnote-4) The Poles were greatly aided by the arrival of their infantry and artillery, who were able to dislodge a section of enemy German infantry. With the departure of the German infantry, the Polish cavalry charged a group of French and English cavalry, and put them to flight, at which point the enemy leaders began to flee as well.

At this point, "There still remained three thousand or more of the foreigners, who stood on the edge of the woods."[[5]](#footnote-5) Eventually these men saw that they were bereft of help from the rest of their army, and chose to accept Zolkiewski's very generous terms of surrender. Their Swedish leaders came back onto the battlefield and followed this example, seeing that they had no other choice left.

The Battle of Klushino has been held up as an example of the superiority of the Polish cavalry in the early 17th century. It was a magnificent victory for Poland-Lithuania: a completely outnumbered army managed to defeat a coalition of its two principal enemies in the Baltic.

Throughout Zolkiewski' account, we see constantly the presence of Western European soldiers. In his account of the battle the decisive turning points always involve them. Their presence at first may seem surprising, as a Swedish and Russian army might not be expected to be full of Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Scots. Who were these soldiers?

**Introduction**

Thousands of English, French, Irish, and Scottish soldiers served Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden during the period of Russia's Time of Troubles (for this study, 1600-1618). This paper will address their lived experience as soldiers in the Baltic. I am focusing on English, French, Irish, and Scottish soldiers because they came from countries at a remove from the struggles in the Baltic. German soldiers arguably played a larger role in the Baltic, but their countries were not as removed, and there were large German communities in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Livonia. Soldiering for Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, or Russia was not as novel an experience for them.[[6]](#footnote-6) Neither will I address Polish-Lithuanian soldiers who hired out to serve under various Russian and Swedish leaders.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The exact dating of the Time of Troubles is debated, but this paper will be covering the period 1600 to 1618.[[8]](#footnote-8) It was in this period that most of the actual warfare was waged, with Poland-Lithuania only leaving Russia in 1618. Other accounts of the Time of Troubles treat the period as one of class struggle and large-scale social disturbance, but those analyses have no real relevance to the lives of British and French soldiers in the Baltic.

The Time of Troubles was a complex blend of civil wars, peasant uprisings, and foreign invasions. From 1601-2 a plague ravaged Russia, causing death and discontent in the country. In 1603 a man appeared claiming to be Dmitri Ivanovich, son of Ivan IV, who had been thought to have died in 1591 under mysterious circumstances. Dmitri claimed that the current Tsar, Boris Godunov, had tried to assassinate him then, but he had managed to escape. Godunov claimed that Dmitri was an imposter, and he is known to history as False Dmitri I. In 1604 False Dmitri I invaded Russia with the help of several Polish-Lithuanian lords acting independently of the royal government. War erupted, and Dmitri managed to take Moscow in 1605, after Boris died of natural causes that year. Dmitri lasted only one year on the throne before he was killed in an uprising of the Muscovites, upset that Dmitri was favoring Poles, and wanting power for themselves.

A new Tsar, Vasilii Shuiski, was proclaimed, but the country erupted into revolt. Several groups claimed that Dmitri had not died, and rose up in his name. Cossacks pillaged the country under their own revived prince, this one claiming to be the son of Fedor Ivanovich. A False Dmitri II arose, and then a False Dmitri III when the former died. Polish-Lithuanian soldiers pillaged the countryside, without official permission of their government.

In 1609 Shuiski asked King Karl IX of Sweden for aid, and he sent troops to join Shuiski's forces. King Zygmunt III of Poland-Lithuania was upset by this development, and he declared war that year, besieging Smolensk, and moving to place his son Władyslaw on the throne of Russia. In 1610 the Russian boyars became tired of Shuiski and deposed him, which gave Zolkiewski an opportunity to take Moscow and put Władyslaw on the throne. In 1611 the Polish-Lithuanian forces took Smolensk and the Swedes Novgorod, and they began taking cities in Northern Russia instead of helping any Russian government. The taking of Moscow triggered a popular uprising, and the Poles were driven out of Moscow within two years. Michael Romanov was elected tsar in 1613, and some of the civil war died down. Fighting with Sweden and Poland-Lithuania still continued, Sweden agreeing to peace in 1617, Poland-Lithuania not until December 1618.

Other wars were fought by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden in this period. They fought each other beginning in 1600 and Sweden went to war with Denmark from 1611-13. While the focus of the paper is on soldiers in the Time of Troubles, examples will also come from those conflicts, and from conflicts stretching just before and after the Time of Troubles, as the conditions were very similar for soldiers serving in them.

British and French soldiers serving in Eastern Europe in this period have been the focus of several studies, but most of them concentrate on a specific ethnic group, in service to a particular country. Bogusław Borowy's chapter on "Anglicy, Szkoci i Irlandczycy w wojsku polskim za Zygmunta III," ("Englishmen, Scots, and Irishmen in the Polish war of Zygmunt III")[[9]](#footnote-9) is perhaps the broadest analysis, as it includes coverage of all British soldiers, but it only focuses on service in Poland, primarily after the exact period I am dealing with, and does not have anything to say about French soldiers. This study will thus be the first to look at all four ethnic groups in service to all three countries.

Several studies have looked at the impact of confession upon the service of foreign soldiers. Robert I. Frost has that Catholic Scottish soldiers preferred to serve Poland-Lithuania, and Ciarán Óg O'Reilly has written that Irish soldiers in general preferred to serve Catholic countries.[[10]](#footnote-10) David Parrott and Idan Sherer have both delved into how confession impacted the everyday service of soldiers.[[11]](#footnote-11) With the three Baltic countries all following different religions, Russia Orthodox Christianity, Sweden Lutheranism, and Poland-Lithuania primarily Catholicism, religion had a great opportunity to effect the experience of soldiers.

By looking at the service of all four ethnic groups, this study hopes to answer the question of how their differing ethnicities played a role in their service in Eastern Europe. Additionally, since they came from different religious backgrounds, this study will also look at how those backgrounds changed the dynamics of their experience. Drawing upon these studies, I find that soldiers served primarily with others of their same ethnic and religious groups, and preferred to serve countries that mirrored their confessions. However, as soldiers stayed in Eastern Europe, these bonds tended to weaken, and they became more open to serving with soldiers of differing backgrounds, and to serving countries whose confession did not match their own. However, these soldiers whom they served with still tended to be foreigners, so the experience of foreignness served to distinguish these men as a group, even when their prior ethnic and confessional backgrounds began to matter less in the environment of Eastern Europe.

While several writers use the blanket term "mercenaries" to refer to these foreign soldiers, I will generally not be using the term. Sarah Percy, in her book *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*, has gone farther than any other writer in actually defining the term "mercenary." She says that the "true mercenary is an independent, private contractor."[[12]](#footnote-12) She does not count hired soldiers from other states, such as Hessians in the American Revolution, as true mercenaries, although she still places them on a spectrum of hired soldiers.[[13]](#footnote-13) Since that strict definition of a mercenary would omit several of the soldiers under examination, and to move the discussion beyond a consideration of mercenaries as soldiers for pay, I will instead be using the more general and neutral term "foreign soldiers."[[14]](#footnote-14) Indeed, several soldiers rejected what we would see as "mere mercenary" motivations for their service.

The sources available do not afford equal coverage of every group of soldiers. French soldiers in the Baltic are a neglected subject, and the lack of secondary sources on them has made research difficult, although this paper goes further than any other in looking at them as a collective phenomenon.[[15]](#footnote-15) Primary sources on Irish soldiers once they arrived in the Baltic are likewise difficult to access, and so coverage of their activities will unfortunately be constrained. Information on Scottish soldiers is the most plentiful, and so they will be a large part of this paper, but not to the exclusion of soldiers of other ethnicities.

The sources for this paper are varied. Some of the sources are writings by the foreign soldiers themselves. These encompass a few different genres. Jacques Margeret wrote a general history of recent events in Russia, published in 1607 as *Estate de l’Empire de Russie et de Grand Duché de Moscovie* (*State of the Empire of Russia and Grand Duchy of Moscow*), which only briefly mentions his own actions.[[16]](#footnote-16) At another end, Thomas Chamberlain wrote a letter to Robert Cecil in which he described his own experiences as a soldier, though with some moderate description of the general state of affairs.[[17]](#footnote-17) In between the two is Pierre de la Ville, who wrote an account entitled *Discours Sommaire de Qui Est Arrivé en Moscovie Depuis le Règne de Juan Vassilyvich Empereur Jusques à Vassily Juavouits Sousky* (*Summary Account of What has Occured in Russia since the Reign of Ivan Vassilovich until Vasili Ivanovich Suiski*), which begins as a general history of Russia, but includes a substantial account of his own actions.[[18]](#footnote-18) Other works by foreign soldiers are generally shorter than these three, and largely include letters. To these sources can also be added a pamphlet called *Swethland and Poland Warres.[[19]](#footnote-19)* The pamphlet purports to be written by an English soldier who has been in service to Sweden, but it was actually written by an English writer and counterfeiter named Anthony Nixon.[[20]](#footnote-20) However, the amount of detail in the pamphlet, which largely agrees with Chamberlain's account, suggests that Nixon was working with an actual English soldier, and was acting as a ghostwriter, instead of making up details out of whole cloth.[[21]](#footnote-21) The pamphlet offers a level of detail of the psychology and suffering of a common soldier that is almost unparalled in all other contemporary writing, and as such is a valuable addition to the source base.

In addition to writings by the soldiers themselves, there are also official documents that deal with soldiers. The state papers of the English government are collected in several places, and they contain details on the recruitment and conduct of British soldiers. A few contracts also survive, as well as letters of recommendation by various rulers to each other of foreign soldiers.

Another type of source is accounts by people other than the foreign soldiers. The writing of Stanislaw Zolkiewski has already come up, and several other eyewitnesses to the Time of Troubles wrote about what they saw. Foreign soldiers come up in several of these accounts. Zolkiewski's account is particularly useful for the perspective of an employer of foreign soldiers.

This paper will proceed through sections that echo the order of events a foreign soldier would encounter in Eastern Europe.[[22]](#footnote-22) It begins with recruitment, and then goes on to the general experience of soldiering in the Baltic, before discussing the specific experience of combat. The paper then covers the experience of changing employers, and finally concludes with an analysis of soldiers' perceptions of and writings about the Baltic. Throughout the paper, examples and analysis are stitched together from the whole chronological span of the period. The point is not to recount events as they happened in historical time, but instead to lay out events in an order mirroring that experienced by the soldiers themselves. The order is not perfectly in line with every soldier's experience: for example, some changed sides before ever engaging in combat, and some never changed sides at all. But the general order would have held true for many soldiers.

I would be remiss if I did not point to a flaw of this study: the lack of analysis of Dutch soldiers. Dutch soldiers were present in large numbers in North-Eastern Europe during the Time of Troubles, and deserve study as Western European soldiers in the Baltic. Their absence is due to my lack of knowledge of Dutch. They will receive mention at points in this study, but, regrettably, the full contours of the Western European military experience in the Baltic will not be explored. It is to be hoped that future scholarship will help to rectify this oversight.

**British and French Soldiers in Eastern Europe Before 1600**

The first British and French soldiers in the Baltic region were crusading knights helping the Teutonic Order against its enemies. As late as 1522, the last Teutonic Grand Master Albrecht Hohenzollern was still contemplating hiring British soldiers to fight against Poland.[[23]](#footnote-23) The era of mass British and French service in the Baltic really begins in the 1560s and 1570s. The earliest record of British soldiers in Swedish service is a cavalry unit led by Andrew Keith in 1563. By 1570, there were three Scottish cavalry units employed in Swedish service, and Sweden hired Scottish infantry in the 1570s.[[24]](#footnote-24) In 1573, the French nobleman Pontus de la Gardie was appointed to lead Swedish troops in Livonia.[[25]](#footnote-25) The first British troops in Poland-Lithuania came in 1577 when a regiment of Scottish soldiers was hired to defend Danzig when it refused to recognize Stefan Batory as the king of Poland. While the Danzigers and their Scots were ultimately defeated, Batory was so impressed with their performance that he recruited Scots for his later military campaigns.[[26]](#footnote-26) The earliest Scottish soldier in Russian service was a General Carmichael during the reign of Ivan IV, who was put in command of 5000 Russian soldiers in 1570.[[27]](#footnote-27) Regrettably, I am unable to find a precise date for the earliest French soldiers in Russian or Polish-Lithuanian service.

Each Baltic power had a different set of reasons for employing western European soldiers. The native Polish-Lithuanian army was heavily cavalry based, and the royal government often had difficulty in levying soldiers from the contentious nobility. Foreign soldiers provided infantry and a population that would serve the royal government in war.[[28]](#footnote-28) Sweden had a low population, only 1,250,000 by the 1630s, due to its relatively inhospitable climate.[[29]](#footnote-29) While Sweden did have intensive levies of its native population, foreign soldiers were needed to make up numbers.[[30]](#footnote-30) For Russia, foreign soldiers were often of higher quality than native troops,[[31]](#footnote-31) and they were better versed in modern warfare. In addition, the conditions of civil war during this period meant that each Russian faction had fewer trustworthy men to recruit from, and so foreign mercenaries helped make up the gap.

**Recruitment**

Recruitment is a somewhat neglected topic in Early Modern military historiography, and so this section hopes to help contribute to this understudied area.[[32]](#footnote-32) This section will focus mainly on soldiers recruited for Swedish service, and soldiers recruited from Britain. In part, this is due to available sources, but this also reflects the reality of recruitment during the Time of Troubles. Sweden always had more of a need for mercenaries than did Poland-Lithuania or Russia, owing to its smaller population. In addition, Russia contracted with Sweden during this period for Sweden to provide soldiers, which it mainly did with foreign soldiers. Russia did not maintain the same level of contact with the west that Sweden did, and was in a much greater internal state of disarray. During the Time of Troubles, most of the foreign soldiers in the Polish-Lithuanian army were either defectors from the Swedish armies, whose their process of joining Poland-Lithuania will be discussed in the section on "Shifting Loyalties," or had been serving as soldiers in the Baltic before the period discussed begins. French soldiers are unfortunately neglected in much of this analysis, though some of the motivations and methods of recruitment found for British soldiers likely applied to them as well.

This section will principally be divided by large-scale and individual recruitment. Most foreign soldiers arrived in Eastern Europe as a part of recruited companies or regiments, with hundreds of fellow soldiers. Some, however, were recruited as individuals to serve different governments. These were primarily officers from the noble class, who had already made a name for themselves in war. They were a very small minority compared to those soldiers recruited in groups, and so will occupy less space in this section.

Large-scale recruitment was ordered and sanctioned by monarchs. The ruler of an eastern European would receive permission from a western European ruler to recruit soldiers in his country. Western European rulers wouldn't always accept the requests of the eastern European monarchs. In 1612, the Swedish king Karl IX requested permission to recruit soldiers in Scotland, but King James VI/I refused him. Sweden was at war with Denmark at the time, and the king of Denmark was James' brother-in-law. James did not want to see Sweden do better in its war against Denmark. The Swedish diplomats swore that the soldiers would only be used in Russia, but James reasoned that even if that were the case, any victories in Russia would mean more resources available to fight against Denmark, and so he forbade any recruitment.[[33]](#footnote-33)

The monarchs of Eastern European countries generally commissioned officers to oversee individual recruiting projects. In 1615 Gustav II Adolf appointed the Scottish noble Patrick Ruthven to recruit soldiers in Scotland and England for him. Gustav wrote of his need for foreign soldiery, as several had been killed by the enemy and others dismissed by him, and so Ruthven, "should enlist one thousand soldiers of esteemed virtue with military training."[[34]](#footnote-34) In exchange, Ruthven would receive payment and a colonel's commission. The contracts mention rewards for those who help the contracted officer, and some offer pay scales for different ranks of soldiers.[[35]](#footnote-35) Baltic governments sometimes sent their own agents to recruit soldiers, but it was usually seen as easier to recruit a native who knew his country.

The officers appointed by the Eastern European monarchs would often subcontract out their work to other officers. Colonel William Stewart, a Scot who had been hired in 1609 to recruit a regiment for Swedish service, gave his friend John Urry a commission as lieutenant-colonel in exchange for the latter helping to recruit soldiers.[[36]](#footnote-36) In general, every company in a regiment would have been recruited by its captain. It was easier for colonels to send out sub-contractors to recruit men than to do it all themselves, especially as recruitment involved going to several towns and villages to recruit enough men.

It is important to look at the situation they were leaving in Western Europe. Scotland was poor and overpopulated at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The English ambassador to Denmark, Robert Anstruther, wrote to the king in 1612 that levies were conducted in Scotland with, "only voluntarie men, of whom the cuntry is full, for want of Imployment."[[37]](#footnote-37) In France, it was a time of religious upheaval. Although the leader of the Protestant cause, Henry of Navarre, had won the French Wars of Religion, it was at the price of conversion to Catholicism. Jacques Margeret, the most notable of the French soldiers serving in the Baltic, was a Protestant, and it is likely that many of the other French soldiers serving in the Baltic were also Protestants, especially given that many were hired by Sweden.

In Britain and France, peace generally prevailed. The French Wars of Religion were over, and the English conquest of Ireland was mostly completed, except for a few minor rebellions. Neither country had any major foreign enemies. Anthony Nixon, to introduce his soldier's account, wrote, "THe Oliue Tree of Peace [...] hath flourished [...] so long in *England*, that other Countries and Kingdomes neighbouring by her [...] haue gotten some braunches of that Tree, and [...] planted the same in their owne Dominions."[[38]](#footnote-38) He proceeded to write of how every country in Western Europe up to the Netherlands was at peace: a fairly accurate statement for the time. Anyone wishing to soldier, therefore, had to travel to the east, which Nixon acknowledged, writing, "Whilst all men here at home sate playing with the Sun-beames of Quietness, and that all the low Country storms began likewise to be laid down calme, so that the English souldier had no place to retire to [...] behold, a fresh Allarum awakes and calls him from hence into *Sweden*."[[39]](#footnote-39)

Actual recruitment was done similarly throughout Europe in the Early Modern period. The recruiter would set up in the middle of a village, and beat a drum and/or raise a flag. He would extoll the benefits of signing up with him, and offer incentives to join. This method seems to have been the most economical, since Andrew Ramsay mentioned that when he was forced to recruit secretly, rather than in the open with the drum, his costs increased.[[40]](#footnote-40) The recruiter was usually the officer in whose unit the recruited villagers would serve. The final destination was apparently not a secret, given that soldiers expressed preferences over which masters to serve. The recruiter would usually provide recruits with clothing and food, but not weapons or horses, as those were forbidden to leave England.[[41]](#footnote-41) The eventual employer would have to furnish arms and mounts. Whether a villager signed up or not depended on the factors discussed here.

Kinship and personal ties played an important role in recruitment. At the highest level, recruiters would often subcontract to their friends. As mentioned before, Colonel William Stewart appointed his "wellbeloved and trustie frend" John Urry to raise 200 men as a company for Stewart's regiment.[[42]](#footnote-42) Lesser officers and common soldiers were also often chosen on the basis of kinship or friendship. A Scottish captain, Andrew Ramsay, attempting to enter Swedish service in 1612, testified that his lieutenant Robert Douglas was his relative.[[43]](#footnote-43) A 1609 report by the English government in Ireland of soldiers levied to serve Sweden reveals that many of the officers among them were relatives or allies of the exiled Earl of Tyrone.[[44]](#footnote-44) Tyrone himself was not among the men levied, but their mutual connection to him shows that these men formed a kinship group. In addition, the list also mentioned that certain of the men listed brought family or followers with them. Art Oge O'Neale and Oghy Oge O'Hanlon had, "in their companies about the number fifty persons their kinsmen and followers."[[45]](#footnote-45) It is clear that, beyond basic ethnic sorting, soldiers preferred to serve with kinsmen and friends. Recruiters went to certain locations because they had ties to those regions, which produced the results of many ethnically, religiously, and culturally homogenous units.

Besides friends and family, soldiers could be persuaded to serve people they had a good opinion of, or who were renowned for their prowess or station. In 1612, Andrew Ramsay illegally recruited men in Scotland without the government's permission. The secretary of Scotland told James VI/I that since Ramsay's brother was in favor with him, many Scotsmen likely assumed that Ramsay had permission from the king to levy men.[[46]](#footnote-46) In 1609 the Lord Deputy of Ireland Arthur Chichester advised that if there were to be any more levies for the Swedish service that they would need to choose officers who would be "most popular with this nation."[[47]](#footnote-47) This did not just mean Irish officers, as Chichester selected two Englishmen to help raise companies, both of whom were of "good credit and

opinions with the Irishry."[[48]](#footnote-48) In this way, recruitment was not just about ethnic or familial ties. Ethnicity obviously still played a part, as recruiters who were popular or well-known in one region would not necessarily be in another.

Religion could play a role in deciding which master to serve. The English had a difficult time levying Irish soldiers to fight for Sweden and Russia in part because the Irish clergy told Irishmen that they should not fight for a Protestant country against a Catholic country. Jesuit and Seminary priests in Leinster and Connaugh said that it was unlawful to fight for, "a heretic and a usurper against a Catholic and a rightful king."[[49]](#footnote-49) The majority of English and Scottish soldiers went to serve Sweden, which was also a Protestant country. It is here that the use of the term "mercenary" becomes problematic. These soldiers were not just available to the highest bidder: they had preferences and standards. Nevertheless, some English and Scottish soldiers did serve Poland-Lithuania, and the English authorities were eventually able to recruit Irishmen to serve Sweden. But even in this service the strength of religious convictions shows. In 1621, soon after the Time of Troubles, Poland-Lithuania recruited a large number of British soldiers for a war with the Ottoman Empire. The Polish ambassador in charge of recruiting soldiers in Britain, Jerzy Ossolinski, wrote, "In my opinion, the Irish are the best, for they are hardy and good Catholics; the Scots are hardy, but they are great heretics. Among the English are many Catholics, but they are soft."[[50]](#footnote-50) This shows that employers also had religious preferences, and expected that troops of their same confession would work better with them. James VI/I accepted this recruitment, where previously he had allowed Sweden to recruit soldiers to fight Poland-Lithuania, because the soldiers were to fight against the Ottoman Empire. As a non-Christian power, the Ottomans made Poland-Lithuania seem religiously closer to Protestant England. While confessional politics were causing great strife in Europe (the Thirty Years War had begun three years before this cycle of recruitment), there was still a lingering ideal of Christendom. Soldiers could serve any confession, since ultimately they were all Christians, but they and their employers preferred that they serve countries of their own or similar confession.

None of the British or French soldiers who served in the Baltic in this period left us with a detailed account of their reasons for service. While we can infer motives from the available sources, we can also look elsewhere for motivations. Although he did not serve in the Baltic, John Smith's account of his voyages contains a small account of his reasons for foreign military service.[[51]](#footnote-51) He served as a soldier across Europe in the 1590s, first in France, and eventually in Hungary, whence he was captured and sent to the Crimean Khanate. He recounts that he "first began to learne the life of a souldier" at a time when he was "seeing his money neere spent."[[52]](#footnote-52) He began his soldiering career in France, but moved on to the Netherlands with "Peace being concluded in *France*."[[53]](#footnote-53) Though these descriptions of his rationale for service are brief, they are more explicit than any contemporary account of service in the Baltic. Smith presents his main concern as money, and he follows war wherever it goes, seeking opportunity. Money was indeed a key motivator for the enlistment of soldiers, especially in Scotland where, as mentioned before, there was a great deal of unemployment. Still, Smith is careful to portray himself as an honorable soldier. He says that he returned to his hometown in England to better practice and study the art of war, and describes his time there thus: "His studie was *Machavills* Art of warre, and *Marcus Aurelius*; his exercise a good horse, with his lance and Ring; his food was thought to be more of venison than any thing else; what he wanted his man brought him."[[54]](#footnote-54) Smith was a sort of hermit of war, diligently attending to his chosen profession.

The experience of the Irish in the recruiting process was very different than that of the English or Scots. While the process was essentially voluntary for the English and Scots, there was a strong element of coercion with the Irish. The English government conceived of the project of recruiting Irish soldiers for Swedish service as a way to rid the Irish countryside of potential rebels. The Nine Years War ended in 1603, but the Ulster Plantation was full of former rebels and loose "swordsmen." Karl IX asked England for soldiers in 1609, and the government conceived of the idea of recruiting these formerly rebellious men to serve in Sweden, so as to ensure the safety of the English settlement in Ireland. The English Privy Council wrote to Arthur Chichester, the Lord Deputy of the Ulster Plantation,

For they esteem it a special good service, as well for the state of the kingdom as for the plantation, that as many of the native Irish as possible were vented out of the land. With this view His Majesty has resolved to send 1,000 men more to be levied in that land.[[55]](#footnote-55)

Recruitment proved somewhat difficult. The Irish mistrusted the English, fearing that the recruitment was a plot, which it really was. Chichester devoted his time to the project. A Captain Richard Bingley had some initial success with recruiting volunteers, but they were not at the scale that the government wanted. Chichester took some men out of prison to send to Sweden.[[56]](#footnote-56) Some soldiers that the English managed to recruit mutinied when brought to their ships, but this mutiny was put down.[[57]](#footnote-57) The government had only wanted to recruit Irishmen, but they were eventually forced to accept Englishmen, those these were pirates and other disreputable men.[[58]](#footnote-58) The English managed to recruit suitable numbers by using local loyalties: convincing well-regarded men to lead as officers. The English government paid for clothing and food for the Irish levies, which was usually done by the officers directly contracted by the Baltic countries. But the greatest priority of the English was taking rebellious Irishmen out of Ulster Plantation. At one point Arthur Chichester contemplated sending the Irish levies to Russia instead of Sweden, as the Irish were not as opposed to Russia's religion as they were to Sweden's.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Some soldiers received individual commissions. They tended to be well-born officers, and had often already been serving in Eastern Europe for some time. In these cases, monarchs would rely on these soldiers to fulfill command roles. As an example, the Frenchman Jacques Margeret went abroad after the conclusion of the French Wars of Religion, and fought for Austria against the Ottoman Turks. His renown spread, and he was personally invited by Tsar Boris Godunov to serve him in Russia, wherein Margeret became the leader of a group of foreign infantry. A Scotsman named Thomas Buck received a commission with the Duke of Courland (a vassal of Poland-Lithuania) thanks to a recommendation from James VI/I. In this letter James mentioned how, "several of our subjects [...] have departed to [serve] in foreign nations, in which number is our subject Thomas Buck."[[60]](#footnote-60) Buck had obviously spent time abroad as a soldier before receiving this commission. These men were unattached to specific units, and instead were given commands recruited from other sources, often ending up serving with soldiers of differing ethnicities.

**Serving Together, Serving Apart**

This section will focus on the experience of foreign soldiers in Eastern Europe, and how they related to each other during their time there. C.F. Finkel writes in his article on French "mercenaries" serving the Ottomans that, "it was commonplace in warfare conducted with an international army that the troops of the various 'nations' should be kept apart to avoid friction, [although] the method of recruitment of mercenary forces inevitably meant that garrisons would be mixed."[[61]](#footnote-61) Foreign soldiers in the Baltic of different nations mixed more frequently than Finkel acknowledges, and not only because of factors of recruitment.

Traveling to the Baltic was a harrowing experience for many of the soldiers. The journey from Britain to Sweden lasted three months in cramped quarters, with a ration of preserved food. Ships often ran into storms, and had to land before their destination. A group of English soldiers en route to Sweden in 1610 ran aground in Jutland. The inhabitants at first treated them well, but then came to believe that the English were out to kill them, and so they imprisoned the English, until the situation was eventually resolved through negotiation. Once in Sweden, these same soldiers had to endure a grueling march through Finland to reach Russia, during which most of the soldiers died to the cold. Nixon's anonymous soldier describes the ordeal thus

[T]he iourney was long and vconmfortable: for we marched from Newyeares day vntil Whitsontide, continually in snow, hauing no rest, but onely a little in the nights. So that the miseries and mis-fortunes which we endured vpon the borders of *Fynland,* were almost insufferable, by reason the number of them seemed infinite.[[62]](#footnote-62)

Most foreign soldiers served in relatively ethnically homogenous groups. The sources mention specific French, English, or Scottish units, usually with commanders from those same countries. In large part, this was due to how they were recruited. As we established above, officers often subcontracted to recruit their own companies, which they tended to recruit from a single area. While soldiers arriving in Sweden would be joined into the main Swedish army, these companies were largely preserved. There was some small amount of existing ethnic diversity in these companies. Nixon's anonymous soldier mentions a Welshman and a Dane in his company, the Dane having lived in England for so long that everyone thought he was English.[[63]](#footnote-63) But the foreign soldiers could also serve with very close relatives. The French colonel Pierre de la Ville was in Swedish service with his brother, a factor which worked against him when his brother was captured by the enemy and used as a bargaining tool to demand la Ville's surrender.[[64]](#footnote-64)

While individual units were generally ethnically homogenous, there was a phenomenon of officers of differing backgrounds from their soldiers. Thus in 1609 the merchant William Bruce reported from Danzig of 1400 infantry passing by led by six Scottish captains. Fewer than 200 of these soldiers were Scottish, and the rest were German.[[65]](#footnote-65) Similarly, Jacques Margeret held the command of German soldiers several times, including leading them to victory at the battle of Dobrynichi. In 1606 he was appointed to lead one hundred men in False Dmitri I's bodyguard. These men were composed of Livonians and Germans, and were grouped into three units of one hundred men each.[[66]](#footnote-66) The other captains of this guard were an Englishman, Matthew Knowlson, and a Scot, Albert Wandmann. Wandmann had served in Poland for such a long period of time before this appointment that he was known as "Pan Skotnicki."[[67]](#footnote-67) Wandmann and Margeret had both served long careers as soldiers in Eastern Europe, and it seems fair to assume that Knowlson had as well. By this point in their career, they were comfortable serving with soldiers of differing ethnicities. Dmitri hired his foreign guard because he distrusted Russian soldiers, and thought that foreign soldiers would be more loyal to him.

While these examples all concern Germans serving under British and French officers, there was another group that served under ethnically distinct leaders: the Irish. As described above, recruitment for the Irish had more of a compulsory nature than for other ethnic groups. Upon their arrival in Sweden, the Irish were placed into existing Scottish or English regiments.[[68]](#footnote-68) The Irish were not fully trusted, and serving in English and Scottish regiments was an attempt to dilute their potential to make trouble.

Although the Irish were placed in mixed regiments, they still asserted their own identity. They demanded to have Catholic mass, and priests infiltrated their ranks, providing spiritual aid, as well as encouraging them to abandon Swedish service.[[69]](#footnote-69) The English documents on the composition of their ranks shows that groups of men were serving with clan leaders.[[70]](#footnote-70) Even if these leaders did not receive formal titles in the Swedish army, they still would be able to form an unofficial network of leaders. These unofficial leaders were able to assert themselves as official officers when the Irish transferred to Polish service (discussed below, in the section entitled "Shifting Loyalties").

Soldiers of different nationalities sometimes served with each other in specific operations. Żołkiewski recounted how "5 Frenchmen and Scots also blundered into our army.[[71]](#footnote-71)" These soldiers must have been out together on a foraging or intelligence-gathering mission. Foreign soldiers also mixed in garrisons, and the German soldier Conrad Bussow reported that English and Irish troops served together in a garrison at Narva.[[72]](#footnote-72) Nixon reported that a mixed group of English and French cavalry drove a group of Poles from an earthwork that was impeding their passage.[[73]](#footnote-73) Although it seems that the norm was units segregated by ethnicity, after a few months in the Baltic, foreign soldiers started to serve alongside each other.

Foreign soldiers tended to be commanded by other foreign soldiers, and separate from national components of armies. In part, this would be due to practical concerns, since their languages and fighting styles were different than those of their employers. As mentioned before, several British and French officers served as commanders of German soldiers. Soldiers of one ethnicity sometimes looked with fondness upon their commanders of another ethnicity. Anthony Nixon wrote about Pierre de la Ville, "who so valiantly led us,"[[74]](#footnote-74) and the German soldier Conrad Bussow approved of his commander, Jacques Margeret.[[75]](#footnote-75)

Some ethnic tensions from back home manifested themselves in Eastern Europe. Chamberlain mistrusted the Irish that he saw in Eastern Europe. He called them "villains,"[[76]](#footnote-76) and attempted to disparage them before Zygmunt.[[77]](#footnote-77) He reported fearfully that the Irish intended to strike at England, swearing, "This is trewe uppon my life."[[78]](#footnote-78) At another point, he wrote in a letter that the Scots in Poland were mostly highlanders "of no credit,"[[79]](#footnote-79) though in that case he was disparaging Scottish merchants in Poland-Lithuania. Two English merchants in Russia reported in 1613 that Jacques Margeret, referred to as "a certem frenchman," was attempting to impede their business and slander them.[[80]](#footnote-80) Even though many foreign soldiers became comfortable serving with each other, and began to conceive of themselves under a unifying identity, they could not completely throw off the prejudices and animosities of the past.

How soldiers served together also raises the question of what language they used in common for communication. Latin would seem to be an obvious choice, given that we have already seen it used for contracts between rulers and military contractors. When a group of Frenchmen and Scots "blundered into" Stanisław Żołkiewski's forces, as recounted above, he handed one of the French soldiers a letter in Latin, pleading for the French to stop fighting against the Poles, as their nations had no quarrel with each other.[[81]](#footnote-81) This would seem to indicate that at least one Frenchman had some knowledge of Latin. However, this cannot have been a language of communication for most soldiers. Latin literacy rates were very low for the poorer classes of society, which the soldiers were largely drawn from.[[82]](#footnote-82) Conrad Bussow mentions that Jacques Margeret was "a Frenchman who, however, was fluent in German.[[83]](#footnote-83)" As Margeret was in command of German soldiers at the time, this fluency made communication much easier for him. Mary Elizabeth Ailes has concluded that British officers likely quickly learned German while serving in the Swedish military.[[84]](#footnote-84) Military service thus had a way of bringing soldiers together linguistically, helping to homogenize them somewhat.

In his narrative, Chamberlain at one point establishes a general identity for foreign soldiers. In reference to how his Swedish commanders withheld pay, he writes," suche hasse been the usage of the Swedens unto strangers, that I doe veryly thincke noen will ever serve them agayne.[[85]](#footnote-85)" He was aware that the conditions that he faced as an English soldier were the same as those faced by other foreign soldiers. This is a perception shared by the soldiers' employers, who often used the term "German" to refer to any foreigner.[[86]](#footnote-86) In Russian and Polish the word originally meant "mute," referring to people who couldn't speak a Slavic language, and in Russian the term came to mean any Protestant foreigner.[[87]](#footnote-87) Even Żołkiewski, who as we have seen was perfectly capable of distinguishing between the different ethnic backgrounds of soldiers, at times uses the term more generally.[[88]](#footnote-88) But there does seem to be a very real sense that foreign mercenaries identified with each other, and held themselves to be a collective group distinct from the native Eastern Europeans. Pierre de la Ville also referred to "foreigners" in the Russian-Swedish army,[[89]](#footnote-89) and Anthony Nixon wrote about how at the battle of Klushino, "none but we strangers were left in the field [...] and of that number there were about sixe hundred French horsemen."[[90]](#footnote-90) Like Chamberlain, they were aware that foreignness and shared interests bound all the soldiers together.

Foreign soldiers were able to tap into networks of their countrymen who were in Eastern Europe for other purposes besides soldiering. Jacques Margeret recounted how he received news of the fate of False Dmitri I from "a French merchant from Kazan named Bertrand," and from "a Frenchman who was a cook for the palatine of Sandomierz."[[91]](#footnote-91) Several English soldiers worked with members of the English Russian Company. The English merchant Thomas Horsey claimed that he was responsible for getting several English and Scottish soldiers employment with Russia in the 1580s.[[92]](#footnote-92) In this way foreign soldiers became part of a larger emigrant community, which by definition they did not share with other foreign soldiers who were not of the same ethnic background. These links do not seem to have been determined by religion, as Margeret makes no note of whether his sources were Protestants like him, or Catholics like most Frenchmen.

**The Experience of Combat**

The available sources do not go into great depth on the particulars of combat. Yuval Noah Harari has shown that this is a general trend in military memoir writing from the period, as soldier-writers cared more about recording notable events than their individual experiences, and so are more likely to record overviews of events than to detail their own contributions.[[93]](#footnote-93) Even in Nixon's ghostwritten account, with its in-depth descriptions of the suffering endured by English soldiers on campaign, the actual events of combat receive relatively little attention. Indeed, combat was somewhat of an atypical event for soldiers, as much more of their time was spent on other activities, such as marching, foraging, or just waiting in camp. Nonetheless, there are a few things we can say about combat from the available sources.

A common perception about mercenary and other professional soldiers is that they are not as effective as national soldiers, as they do not have as high an attachment to the cause that they are fighting for. This has been a popular scholarly idea for some time, and has Early Modern roots dating back to Machiavelli,[[94]](#footnote-94) but recent works have taken a stance against it. David Parrott and Idan Sherer have shown in recent books that mercenary and professional soldiers were actually quite effective.[[95]](#footnote-95) Sherer points out that while scholars believe the differing motivations of professional and mercenary soldiers from national forces renders them less effective soldiers, in reality their day-to-day motivations are hardly any different from those of other soldiers.[[96]](#footnote-96) British and French soldiers in Eastern Europe were no exception to this.

Indeed, foreign soldiers had fairly high combat morale, even compared to national troops. As recounted in the preface, Zolkiewski wrote that the foreign soldiers fought particularly hard at Klushino. Indeed, at that battle, the foreigners lasted longer on the field than their native allies, and even than their commanders. The Russian soldiers fled early on, and then the Swedish general Jacob de la Gardie ran off halfway through the battle, leaving only 2000-3000 foreign soldiers still on the field.[[97]](#footnote-97) After that, the foreign soldiers started surrendering in different groups. A group of French cavalrymen went over to the Polish-Lithuanians first, followed by a group of English cavalry. A group of mixed foreign infantry lasted the longest, but they too eventually surrendered. Still, they had outlasted all the native Russian and Swedish forces. Another example of the high morale of foreign soldiers comes from Pierre de la Ville's defense of Dega in the months after the Battle of Klushino. He was surrounded by a numerically superior Polish-Lithuanian army, and his commander, Jacob de la Gardie, had all but surrendered to the Poles, but he kept the Polish-Lithuanians at bay for some time, even making sorties against the Poles. He stated that he would not surrender, as his honor was tied to that place.[[98]](#footnote-98) He was eventually forced to surrender by the recognition of his helplessness, but the achievement of his defense still held. Hired foreign troops, of all ethnic backgrounds, would last on the field.

From this same evidence, it seems that units in combat could sometimes be grouped by nationality. Nixon and Chamberlain delineate the foreign cavalry into English and French components. On the whole, however, it seems like the greater division was between foreign and non-foreign troops. Żołkiewski mentions the English and French cavalry at Klushino working together, "again and again coming to each other's aid,"[[99]](#footnote-99) and Bussow and Massa both tell of how Jacques Margeret led the German soldiers to victory at Dobrynichi.[[100]](#footnote-100)

Some western soldiers brought special skills to bear in Eastern Europe. Particularly important were skills at siege warfare. Żołkiewski recounts how at the beginning of the siege of Smolensk a council was held on how best to take the city, and "All the senators in the camp who might know something about capturing castles were summoned to it." In addition to these senators, "there were several foreign infantry who claimed that they understood this well. There was one old colonel, a Scot, who, asked his opinion, said at length that it was a zoo not a castle, that it would easily be taken."[[101]](#footnote-101) Poland-Lithuania also employed a number of Frenchmen as artillery officers.[[102]](#footnote-102)

**Shifting Loyalties**

One reason for examining British and French soldiers in service to Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden, instead of just in service to one of the countries specifically, is that soldiers very often changed sides during the period, through compulsion or choice. Jacques Margeret serves as an example of this. He began his career as a soldier fighting in France and then for Austria against the Ottomans, before coming to serve Tsar Boris Godunov in Russia. After Godunov's defeat, he went into False Dmitri I's service, following which he left for France, but came back to Eastern Europe in the Polish army. He left that army, and attempted to fight for Russia, but was rejected, and and after serving in the private army of Janusz Radziwiłł until Radziwiłł 's death, he ended up in the service of Sweden. While the amount of different masters that Margeret went through is exceptional for the period, he illustrates a very real phenomenon of shifting loyalties. Changes in loyalty were often effected by ethnic and religious considerations, or else nationality and religion played a role in how different soldiers perceived their involuntary changes of masters.

Ethnic ties were sometimes used to convince soldiers to change loyalties. In August 1615, the English captain Jacob Shaw convinced a group of English and Scottish soldiers serving the Lithuanian captain Aleksander Lisowski to abandon Lisowski's service and take up with Russia. He had been sent purposefully by the Russian commander Pozharskii because of the shared ethnic connection he had with these soldiers.[[103]](#footnote-103) In a similar but somewhat different vein, Zolkiewski wrote a letter to French soldiers in Swedish service, asking why they fought against him, when their nations and kings had always been friends.[[104]](#footnote-104) While Zolkiewski's letter did not inspire any soldiers to immediately defect, as the bearer of the letter was hanged, it did inspire discontent, and helped pave the way for French soldiers to defect at Klushino.

The Battle of Klushino marked the single largest number of changes of loyalty. At one stroke, Zolkiewski welcomed over two thousand foreign soldiers into his army.[[105]](#footnote-105) The soldiers surrendered in different groups: first the French cavalrymen, then the English and Dutch infantrymen, who were then followed by the main Swedish forces. Zolkiewski offered the foreign soldiers either the same pay that Sweden had promised, though he would actually deliver, or a pass out of Poland, which they could receive at Smolensk.[[106]](#footnote-106) The terms were very favorable to the foreign soldiers, especially because Sweden had not paid them in several months.[[107]](#footnote-107) Most accepted his offer, showing for many the primacy of financial considerations.

Poland-Lithuania made it a something of a policy to win over foreign mercenaries. During the Time of Troubles Poland-Lithuania did not recruit foreign soldiers on the scale that Sweden did. Instead, its commanders made an effort to persuade foreign soldiers in Swedish service to come over to their side. Klushino was the apogee of this policy, but it was not the only time this happened. Indeed, Zolkiewski thought to win over foreign soldiers at Klushino because, "first some dozen of these foreign soldiers had come over to us at Biela, and later some scores, and they held out hope that if the Hetman would write to them, more would come over."[[108]](#footnote-108) The soldiers who "held out hope" were both French and Scottish. Polish commanders could appeal to both groups at the same time.

Russia made it difficult to switch loyalties. The Dutch merchant Isaac Massa noted that "those who take service in Muscovy are hired only on condition that they stay there all their lives."[[109]](#footnote-109) This was not an air-tight policy: Massa mentioned this policy when describing how several foreign soldiers were given permission to leave by False Dmitri I. He however notes the incredulity of the Muscovites at their departure. Jacques Margeret received special permission to leave Russia in 1607, because he had made powerful friends among the boyars. He claimed that he was the only person who had been allowed to leave Russian service,[[110]](#footnote-110) While that was an exaggeration, it does speak to the general strictness of the policy. The example of the Battle of Klushino also shows another way that soldiers could leave Russian service.

Irish soldiers were very glad to change loyalties to serve Poland. Their clergy were initially against them serving a Protestant power against a Catholic king, so when they had the opportunity to reverse that loyalty, they took it. In 1609 some Irish soldiers came over to the Polish side even before they landed in Sweden, commandeering their vessels and taking them to Poland.[[111]](#footnote-111) In 1611, a group of 300 newly recruited Irish soldiers ran away within a month to join the Polish forces.[[112]](#footnote-112) Eventually Gustav Adolf put a stop to recruitment of more Irish soldiers, because they were too unreliable when fighting against Catholic monarchs.[[113]](#footnote-113)

Some English soldiers refused the Polish offer after the Battle of Klushino. The soldier whom Anthony Nixon ghostwrote for was one such. As a group, he and the other English soldiers who refused Polish service first had to go to Smolensk, where they received passes of safe conduct from Zygmunt III, after which they headed to Danzig to take ship and leave Eastern Europe. Nixon's account doesn't offer the reasons his soldier refused Polish service (besides, perhaps, fatigue from all he had endured in the Baltic), but Chamberlain offers some insight. Chamberlain also refused service with the Polish army, though he seems to have ingratiated himself somewhat with the Poles at Smolensk. He did not reciprocate the feeling, and instead bitterly criticized the "papishe"[[114]](#footnote-114) plots of Zygmunt III. For him, it seems like religion was a negative factor to switch sides. He did not want to support a Catholic country against its enemies. Chamberlain had a clear vision of what Poland-Lithuania was, as he wrote of "the which the pooles have ussed unto the Russes in theise warres," which made the Russians hate the Poles so much that they would rather see themselves ruled by any other country.[[115]](#footnote-115) His motivation to not serve was largely ideologically based, as strongly as the motivation of Irish soldiers to serve Poland-Lithuania.

Pierre de la Ville also refused to enter Polish service, but his rejection was based primarily on honor. After Klushino he was asked to surrender his forces, but he refused, "Wanting to prefer my honor and the faith promised to the Emperor Suiski to the promises of the Poles."[[116]](#footnote-116) He believed that changing sides would reflect poorly upon himself. In the 17th century, foreign military service was regarded as an honorable profession, and selling out to the Poles for pay would have diminished la Ville's honor. In his rationale, we also see his judgment of the Poles, namely that they do not keep their promises. La Ville never reveals his religious background, but given his high rank and long service with Sweden, it seems likely that he was a Protestant, and so serving Poland-Lithuania would have been distasteful for him. Although he had integrated with other foreign soldiers (see above p. 26 for a positive valuation of him by an English soldier), he linked himself more with Protestant foreign soldiers than with foreign soldiers in general.

Occasionally, an attempt to change loyalties would be rejected by the country the soldiers wished to defect to. In 1612 a group of soldiers led by Baron Adrian Flodorf, Arthur Aston, and James Hill, comprised mostly of Englishmen, landed at Arkhangel'sk and presented themselves to the Russian National Government for service. They were rejected by the Russians as "unneeded"[[117]](#footnote-117) A Russian embassy to England told the English that they rejected the soldiers because Jacques Margeret was affiliated with them, and he "is a known enemy of the Moscow state."[[118]](#footnote-118) Indeed, the Second National Militia called him a "traitor... the most evil of the Polish people... the Frenchman Iakov Marzheret."[[119]](#footnote-119) Changing sides too often could sour a potential employer on the merits of a particular soldier.

Flodorf's group of soldiers shows how ethnic and religious differences broke down with continued service in Eastern Europe. Flodorf was an Austrian nobleman, Aston an English Catholic,[[120]](#footnote-120) and Margeret a French Protestant. All of them would normally be in some opposition to each other, and none would have originally come to Eastern Europe in the company of the others. However, after time spent in Eastern Europe, they were able to work together to seek soldierly employment.

Of course, beyond any ideological reason, money was a prime motivator for soldiers to change their loyalties. As mentioned above, Thomas Chamberlain complained of a lack of pay by his Swedish masters. So, after the Battle of Klushino, Żołkiewski offered to pay the soldiers the same wages that the Swedes had promised. This was very convincing for the soldiers, and many of them came over. Zolkiewski reported that after the battle a group of English soldiers threatened Jacob de la Gardie if he did not give up their unpaid wages, although they were restrained by a group of Finnish and native Swedish soldiers.[[121]](#footnote-121) He also wrote that he wound up dismissing 1,700 of his foreign soldiers because he was, "fearing some change of allegiance on their part as they were unpaid and the means available were not equal to the pay-rate for so many."[[122]](#footnote-122) While ethnicity and confession affected shifts in loyalty, desire for money was a base reality for many soldiers. The shift towards a conception of themselves as a larger group of "strangers" could actually help them actualize this goal. While Margeret displayed some animosity towards Poland-Lithuania, it seems that what really drove the project that he, Flodorf, and Aston set out on was a desire for money. Earlier in their service, they might have had more qualms about serving masters who didn't match their confession, or working alongside other soldiers of differing confessions and ethnicities, but service in the Baltic acculturated them to these differences. Similarly, the harsh experiences that English soldiers faced in Swedish service likely led them to reconsider their service. Serving with Sweden against Poland-Lithuania was the confessionally proper thing for them to do, but after most of them died on their way through Finland, and their pay was withheld for months, they began to reconsider how strongly they felt about serving Sweden.

Finally, personal animosity was also a reason for some mercenaries to switch loyalties. Patrick Gordon reported to James VI/I in 1612 that the Poles had, "one Scottish captane called Hammilton: Who being abused by the Polonian Coronel, went to the enemie."[[123]](#footnote-123) After being virulently rejected by the Russian government, Jacques Margeret went to serve Janusz Radziwiłł. While Radziwiłł did align with Margeret's confession, being a protector of Calvinism in Poland-Lithuania,[[124]](#footnote-124) at the time, it did seem that Margeret was living out the expectation of the "Council of the Realm" that, "he [should] find refuge in no land except Poland."[[125]](#footnote-125) These two captains had no fundamental problem with potential employers, but were driven away because of their direct experiences.

**Perceptions and Lasting Impressions of Eastern Europe**

Soldiers in Eastern Europe were active observers of their surroundings, and several wrote about the region or their services, or both. They expressed opinions about different facets of Eastern Europe, opinions which could be very strong. These opinions were heavily affected by confession, and somewhat by ethnicity, though their expression was also affected by the audience for which they were writing. Several of them wrote books or pamphlets which were important sources for introducing Western Europeans to the events unfolding in Eastern Europe. Others found the Baltic such an attractive place to live that they stayed there for the rest of their lives.

Protestant writers often displayed an affinity for Russia and a dislike of Poland. Although Anita Gilman Sherman has shown that Poland was thought of as remarkable in early 17th century England for its religious toleration,[[126]](#footnote-126) Protestant foreign soldiers who had served in the Baltic did not share that valuation. Poland was criticized as a Catholic country, under control of the Jesuits. It preyed upon the innocent and defenseless Russians. Beyond valuing the Russians in a negative sense against the Catholic Poles, Protestant writers actually praised their devotion. Margeret noted their piety, "They observe holy days precisely, and even Friday just as much as Sunday,"[[127]](#footnote-127) and Chamberlain made sure to mention how much they venerated "our Inglishe Saint George".[[128]](#footnote-128) This positive valuation was not always held by Protestant writers. In earlier English accounts of Russia, the Orthodox Church is thought of as backwards, and closely linked to the Catholic Church. The English merchant George Turbeville wrote in 1587, "Their idols have their hearts, on God they never call,"[[129]](#footnote-129) and another Englishman , the ambassador Giles Fletcher, wrote in 1591, "they hold with the papists that their church traditions are of equal authority with the written word of God."[[130]](#footnote-130) It seems that part of this new positive valuation is due to the contrast with Poland. When the soldiers wrote about Russia, they were writing during an invasion by Catholics. Earlier writers were comparing Russia to England, against which it was lacking, but against Poland, it was better.

Another reason for some of these valuations of Russia and Poland is that they served a specific purpose. Both Thomas Chamberlain and Jacques Margeret were involved in a plan to have James VI/I elected Tsar of Russia. English observers saw Russia during the Time of Troubles as disunited, and prone to collapse and anarchy. Therefore, in 1612 members of the Russia Company conceived of a plan to elect James VI/I Tsar of Russia. They thought that James could appear as a source of stability to the Russians, and would be welcomed as a religious opponent of Catholic Poland. To help accomplish this task, they made use of Thomas Chamberlain and Jacques Margeret. Chamberlain's narrative, which has been drawn upon for so many details in this essay, was written to Robert Cecil, Minister of the Exchequer, who was instrumental in running James' foreign policy.[[131]](#footnote-131) In his letter, he briefly mentioned that, " theare are but tooe ports that I can hear of in the whole Empier, Saint Nicolas which is in the Northe East and Vanagrod which is in the Bothome of the Sownd, and is in the Southe West, which parte is the most conveniants for a armye to land at to invade."[[132]](#footnote-132) Later, he wrote a similar letter to James himself, which was more forcefully worded than his initial proposal.

that yf his Magest may have an offer of the soverainty of that part of Moscovia, which lyeth betweene the Archangell and the river Volga, with the tract along that river to the Caspian or Persian sea [...], yt will be the greatest and happiest ouverture that ever was made to any King of this realme, since Columbus offered King Henry VII the discovery of the West Indies.[[133]](#footnote-133)

Commercial reasons were a major justification for the intervention, as might be expected from working with the Russia Company, but Chamberlain also makes sure to frame it as a charitable action: "[in this proposal there is] much charity towards those oppressed people,"[[134]](#footnote-134) which would bring glory to James. Around the time that Margeret wrote his letter, he was working with Flodorf and Aston, and so the idea of cooperating with foreigners seems to have been on his mind. More of a motivation shines through in his religious stance. The first sentence of his letter to James reads, "Your Majesty might wish to consider how to undo the intrigues and plots that the popes have always supported in order to set foot in Russia by means of the kings of Poland."[[135]](#footnote-135) He flatters James' Protestant bona fides, and the last sentence of his letter reads, "This would make you the terror of the antichrist, [and you would be] feared by the Turk and dreaded by the Tatars and all your enemies."[[136]](#footnote-136) While Margeret certainly was a strident Protestant, his audience effected the expression of his beliefs. He had served Poland-Lithuania before, so he was probably not quite as much of a hardliner as this letter would suggest.

While Jacques Margeret displayed his vehement Protestant sympathies in his letter to James VI/I, he was much more subdued when writing for a general French audience. His book *Estate de l’Empire de Russie et de Grand Duché de Moscovie*, published in 1607 when Margeret was back in France, was one of the first French accounts of Russia, and helped introduce the region to the public.[[137]](#footnote-137) The book was dedicated to Henri IV, who had led the Protestant side in the French Wars of Religion, but now reigned as a Catholic. Throughout the book, Margeret makes no mention of his Protestantism, and instead presents the ethnography, geography, and recent history of Russia, with himself as a very minor player in the whole. He makes no mention of Poland at all, and so does not criticize it. He does however praise Russia for its piety. In his dedication, he writes that he hopes his book will persuade others to go and serve Russia, "one of the main bulwarks of Christianity."[[138]](#footnote-138)He mentions some of their religious errors, such as believing that the Holy Spirit comes only from the Father through the Son, instead of from both the Father and the Son,[[139]](#footnote-139) but on the whole he offers a sympathetic appraisal of Russia. Margeret was careful to write for his audience, so as not to offend anyone in the majority Catholic France. In light of his other writings, his positive appraisal of Russian religion seems to come from his Protestant bias, but it is more restrained in *Estate de l'Empire* than in his letters.

While many foreign soldiers were unhappy with Sweden, others found it a place to make a permanent home. Mary Elizabeth Ailes has documented the British military community in Sweden in her book *Military Migration and State Formation: The British Military Community in Seventeenth-Century Sweden*. Most of the community was comprised of Scots, with Englishmen and Irishmen comprising about ten percent of the total British military establishment in Sweden.[[140]](#footnote-140) She has found that British officers could rise to very high positions in Swedish society, and that over time their native-born children became more accepted as Swedes. British customs did not permeate Sweden, as the land-holdings of the British officers were spread throughout the country, but they did form a network of contacts with each other, as we have already seen in nascent form.[[141]](#footnote-141) Frenchmen also stayed in Sweden. Jacob de la Gardie, who led the Swedish forces in the Time of Troubles, was the son of Pontus de la Gardie, who was born in Rieux in Languedoc in 1520 to a French noble family.[[142]](#footnote-142) Jacques Margeret likely ended up in Sweden as well, judging from a report from 1621 that mentions, "the Frenchman Margeret, commanding the infantry."[[143]](#footnote-143) Margeret ended his known career in a Protestant country, true to his confession.

On the other hand, Chamberlain expressed dissatisfaction with Sweden. As mentioned above, he said that Sweden was no place for any foreigners, as long as they didn't pay their soldiers.[[144]](#footnote-144) But within this dislike of Sweden, a Protestant bias shows. he were dissatisfied with Sweden, and they translated that into a rejection of the Baltic as a whole. Chamberlain was not willing to soldier for Russia, which was only semi-European, and whose soldiers had fled at Klushino, or for Poland-Lithuania, which was too Catholic. He left military service in the Baltic after Klushino, and soon came back to England.

A few foreign soldiers also stayed on in Russia and Poland-Lithuania. As previously mentioned, Russia's official policy was to not permit foreign soldiers to leave the country, so many stayed in the country. Ivan IV took several hundred foreign soldiers serving Sweden prisoner in 1581, and after they served him well in battle against the Tatars, several were given land and brides.[[145]](#footnote-145) At the beginning of the 17th century, the Tsar had a Scottish captain named Gabriel who served as his personal physician, "for want of anyone better."[[146]](#footnote-146) Jacques Margeret was content to serve Lithuanian Prince Janusz Radziwiłł until the latter's death in 1620, and likely would have stayed in Lithuania longer if he could have. Poland had a large Scottish immigrant community, and later in the seventeenth century there were several noble officers of Scottish descent to be found in the Commonwealth.[[147]](#footnote-147)

Unfortunately, we don't have any retrospective writings from Catholic soldiers about their experiences in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, there are some things we can say about their perception of Eastern Europe. Although Poland-Lithuania was the most religiously mixed country in early 17th century Europe,[[148]](#footnote-148) we have seen that foreign soldiers viewed it as a Catholic country, and this perception was shared by the Catholic soldiers. Sweden was seen as a Protestant country, which Catholic soldiers preferred to avoid. Russia was somewhere in between the two. We have seen that Catholic soldiers such as Arthur Aston and the Baron Flodorf had no issue with serving Russia. It is unlikely that they identified with it as strongly as Protestant writers did, but it does not seem that they identified against it.

For many of the Irish Catholics, the Baltic was a place of exile. The Earl of Tyrone, viewing the English levies of Irishmen from exile in the Spanish Netherlands, wrote, "By various means he [James VI/I] has achieved his purpose that none should return to Ireland alive. In all these ways he has procured to sap the strength of the Catholics so that, thus weakened, they may not resist the final blow which he intends to strike."[[149]](#footnote-149) His view was shared by many in Ireland. Priests in Ulster warned prospective soldiers that the English would drown them at sea if they went on ships to Sweden.[[150]](#footnote-150) While the Irish who ended up in the Baltic obviously ignored the warnings of the priests of Ulster, this conception of the Baltic as a place of exile must have been present on their minds. After the Battle of Klushino, Władysław III offered a group of Irish soldiers the opportunity to continue in his service, but they refused, "saying that the King of Spayne was a better king, one whome theay would depend."[[151]](#footnote-151) They told the Polish king of how they would one day take back Ireland from the English. While this conception was not shared by all the Irish, as we have already seen some settled in the Baltic, it was nevertheless very real. Even though the Irish as Catholics shared an affinity with Poland, it was not enough to make them want to stay there and serve the Polish king.

**Conclusion**

Foreign soldiers would continue to serve in the Baltic throughout the seventeenth century. The number of soldiers serving Poland-Lithuania and Sweden declined as their power waned around the turn of the eighteenth century, but service to Russia continued briskly all throughout the eighteenth century.

Differing identities greatly effected the experiences of English, French, Irish, and Scottish soldiers who served in the Baltic during Russia's Time of Troubles. Echoing existing scholarship, this study has found that soldiers generally preferred to serve countries whose confession aligned with their own. They also preferred to serve alongside soldiers whose ethnicity matched theirs. But once they arrived in the Baltic, this began to change. Soldiers had to serve alongside each other, and the vagaries of war meant that many passed into masters whose confessions did not align with their own. They became more receptive to serving masters and alongside soldiers of differing ethnicities and religions. This process was more than just the cynical profiteering of mercenaries. British and French soldiers in the Baltic found that their various differences between each other mattered less than their differences from the general population that now lived around them. As a result, they formed a new corporate identity, one in which they were acutely aware that they were all "strangers" together. This conclusion should have implications for the study of soldiers in the Early Modern period more broadly, as many soldiers in other conflicts such as the Thirty Years War had similar experiences of shifts in service and the reconstitution of units. More work looking at soldiers from different backgrounds and how they functioned together will help show how broadly this model applies.

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1. Hetman was a Polish-Lithuanian title roughly equivalent to Field Marshal. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had four hetmans in charge of its military: a hetman and a junior hetman in the Kingdom of Poland, and the same in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Stanisław Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow, a Memoir,* trans. M.W. Stephen (London: Polonica Publications, 1959), 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow,* 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow,* 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. At this point, I should note the geographic terms I am using. I will be referring to British, French, and Dutch soldiers as being from "Western Europe," while the countries of Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and Sweden are "the Baltic" or "Eastern Europe." In the period, Europe was commonly divided between North and South, instead of East and West, and defining Sweden as Eastern European even today would be difficult to argue. Nevertheless, the terms I use reflect a clear distinction between the two spheres. Russia, in particular, was thought of as very separate from the British or French experience, being called a "Rude and Barbarous kingdom." "British" is a somewhat anachronistic term for the period, but it is a useful shorthand for English, Irish, and Scottish soldiers. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For these Polish-Lithuanian soldiers, see T Bohun, "Polish-Lithuanian Mercenaries in the Service of Jacob de la Gardie," *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. History*, vol. 63, issue 3 (2018): 718–728; Brian Davies, "Lisowski’s Free Lances: Polish-Lithuanian Mercenaries in Muscovy’s Time of Troubles." *Russian History*, Vol. 42 (2015): 97-113. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See Maureen Perrie, "The Time of Troubles," in *The Cambridge History of Russia Volume 1: From Early Rus' to 1689*, ed. Maureen Perrie (Cambridge: 2006) for a larger overview of the debate. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Bogusław Borowy, "Anglicy, Szkoci i Irlandczycy w wojsku polskim za Zygmunta III," in *Studia z Dziejów Kultury Polskiej*, ed. Henryk Barycz and Jan Hulewicz (Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff, 1949). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Robert I. Frost, "Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years War," in *Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618-1648*, ed. Steve Murdoch (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2001), 211; Ciarán Óg O'Reilly, "The Irish Mercenary Tradition in the 1600s," in *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. John France (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 390. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. David Parrott, *The Business of War*: *Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: 2012.), 60; Idan Sherer, *Warriors for a Living: The Experience of the Spanish Infantry in the Italian Wars, 1494-1559* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 244. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford: 2007), 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Percy, *Mercenaries*, 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. This term was used contemporarily, for example by Żołkiewski. *Expedition to Moscow*, 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. French soldiers receive a small analysis in Zofia Libiszowska ,"Les Français en Pologne au XVIIe Siècle," *Acta Universitatas Lodziensis*, Vol. 33 (1992), but her analysis mostly focuses on a later period, and is frustratingly unforthcoming with specific dates or citations. A particular Frenchman, Jacques Margeret, has received a good deal of attention, but I am unable to find any secondary literature on any other French soldiers in the Baltic in this period. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Jacques Margeret, *The Russian Empire and Grand Duchy of Muscovy: A 17th Century French Account* *by Jacques Margeret*, trans. Chester S.L. Dunning (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1983). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Thomas Chamberlain, "Thomas Chamberlayne ad Robertum Cecil relatio de servitio militari cum Moscovitis contra regem Poloniae, dein cum Polonis contra Moscoviam praestito," in *Elementa Ad Fontium Editiones VI: Res Polonicae Iacobo i Angliae Regnante Conscriptae Ex Archivis Publicis Londoniarum* [Henceforth *EFE*]*,* ed. Carolus H. Talbot (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1962). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Pierre de la Ville, *Discours Sommaire de Ce Qui Est Arrivé en Moscovie Depuis le Règne de Juan Vassilyvich Empereur Jusques à Vassily Juavouits Sousky* (Paris: Libraire A. Franck, 1859), [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Anthony Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," in *English Military News Pamphlets, 1513-1637*, ed. David Randall (ACMRS: Tempe, AZ: 2011), [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. David Randall, *English Military News Pamphlets, 1513-1637* (ACMRS: Tempe, AZ, 2011), 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Nixon's reliability is even more apparent in comparison to another contemporary English pamphlet dealing with the Time of Troubles: Henry Brereton's *News of the Present Miseries of Rushia*. This other pamphlet offers the most baffling idea about False Dmitri I, namely, that there was never any question about his identity, and that he simply ascended to the throne after the death of his father. With this as an example of how much English pamphleteers could get wrong, the amount that Nixon obviously got right stands out. Henry Brereton, "News of the Present Miseries of Rushia," in *The False Dmitri*, ed. Sonia E. Howe (London: Williams and Northgate, 1916). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. A similar approach is taken by Idan Sherer in his book on Spanish soldiers in the Italian Wars. He also begins with recruitment, and goes through a number of experiences that Spanish soldiers underwent. However, the experiences that British and French soldiers underwent in the Baltic were qualitatively different than those of the Spanish soldiers, and so my sections are different from his. Sherer, *Warriors for a Living.* [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Borowy, "Anglicy, Szkoci, i Irlandczycy," 293. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ailes, Mary Elizabeth. *Military Migration and State Formation* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2002), 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Jacques R. Montmitonnet,,"Les de la Gardie d'Aprés des Archives de Famille Conservées a Iouriev," *Bulletin historique et littéraire (Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Français)* Vol. 46, No. 7 (1897), 341. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Frost, "Scottish Soldiers," 195-196. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. A. Francis Steuart. *Scottish Influences in Russian History* (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1913), 19, 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Peter Paul Bajer. *Scots in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 16th-18th Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Frost, *Northern Wars*, 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ailes, *Military Migration*, 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Chester S. L. Dunning, *Russia's First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. "Draft from the King's Secretary to Sir Robert Anstruther," in *History of the Scottish Expedition to Norway in 1612*, ed. Thomas Michell (London: T. Nelson and Sons, 1886) [Hereafter, HSEN], 135 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. "conscribat millenos milites probata virtutis et armaturae." Gustav II Adolf, "Commission from Gustavus Adolphus to Captain Ruthven to Levy Troops for his Service" in *Ruthven Correspondence* ed. Rev. William Dunn Macray (London: J.B. Nichols and Sons, 1868), 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Karl IX, "King Charles his compact and promised stipend to such voluntaries," in Samuel Purchas, *Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes,* Vol XIV (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1906), 200-202. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. William Stewart, "Commission to John Urry, from Colonel William Stewart, to be Lieutenant-Colonel in the Swedish Service," in *Ruthven Correspondence*, ed. William Dunn Macray (London: J.B. Nichols and Sons, 1868), 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Robert Anstruther, "Sir Robert Anstruther to the King. From Halmsteade the 10 of Agust 1612," in *HSEN*, 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. "Examination of Alexander Ramsay," trans. Thomas Michell, in *HSEN*, 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Correr, Marc' Antonio, "May 14. Original Despatch, Venetian Archives," in *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in Other Libraries, Vol IX*, ed. Horatio F. Brown (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1970), 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. William Stewart, "Commission to John Urry, from Colonel William Stewart, to be Lieutenant-Colonel in the Swedish Service," in *Ruthven Correspondence*, ed. William Dunn Macray (London: J.B. Nichols and Sons, 1868), 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. "Paper Endorsed: The Examination of Androw Ramsay and Robert Dowglas," trans. Thomas Michell, in *HSEN*, 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. "Irish Levies for Swedish Service," in *Calendar of the state papers, relating to Ireland, of the reign of James I. Vol. III: 1608-1610* [Hereafter *CSPI*]*,* ed. C.W. Russell and John P. Prendergast (London: Longman & Co, 1874), 305-306 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. "Irish Levies for Swedish Service," in *CSPI*, 305 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. James VI/I, "Draft of Letter from the King to Sir Robert Anstruther, dated 16, Sept 1612," in *HSEN*, 140. James did not accept this reasoning, but it does not seem entirely implausible. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Arthur Chichester, "Sir Arthur Chichester to the Privy Council," in *CSPI*, 305. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Chichester, "To the Privy Council," 305. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. John Davis, "Sir John Davys to Salisbury, " in *CSPI*, 300. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Quoted in Frost, "Scottish Soldiers," 203. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. This is the same John Smith who helped settle Jamestown, and who is famous from the story of Pocahontas. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. John Smith, *The True Travels, Adventures, and Observations of Captaine Iohn Smith, In Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, from Anno Domini 1593 to 1629* (London: Thomas Slater, 1630), 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Smith, *The True Travels*, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Smith, *The True Travels*, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. "Lords of the Council to Sir Arthur Chichester," in *CSPI*, 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. John Davis, "Sir John Davis to Salisbury," in *CSPI*, 281. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Arthur Chichester, "Sir Arthur Chichester to the Privy Council, Oct. 31, 1609" in *CSPI*, 304. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Arthur Chichester, "Sir Arthur Chichester to the Privy Council, Sept. 23, 1610," in *CSPI*, 496. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Arthur Chichester, "Remembrances Concerning the Public, given to Mr. Treasurer 29th January 1609," in *CSPI*, 371. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. "inde evenit ut nonnulli ex subditis nostris in militia educati, aut eidem operam daturi in exteras nationes proficiscantur, quo in numero subditus hic noster est Thomas Bucke." James VI/I, "Iacobus I rex Angliae ad Gulielmum ducem Curlandiae, Thomam Bucke militem commendat," in *EFE*, 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. C.F. Finkel, "French Mercenaries in the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1593-1606: The Desertion of the Papa Garrison to the Ottomans in 1600," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (1992), 453. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Nixon, *Swethland and Poland Warres*, 118, 120 [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. la Ville, *Discours Sommaire,* 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. William Bruce, " de damnis mercatoribus Anglis a mìlitibus Germanicis illatis; de quodam thaumaturgo Babyloniensi," in *EFE*, 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. "The Reporte of a Bloudie and Terrible Massacre in the Citty of Mosco, with the fearefull and tragicall end of DEMETRIUS the last Duke, before him raigning at this present," trans. W. Russell, in *The False Dmitri*, ed. Sonia E. Howe, (London: Williams and Northgate, 1916), 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Conrad Bussow, *The Disturbed State of the Russian Realm*. Trans. G. Edward Orchard, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994) 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Chester S.L Dunning and David R.C. Hudson, "The Transportation of Irish Swordsmen to Sweden and Russia and plantation in Ulster (1609-1613)," *Archivium Hibernicum*, Vol. 66 (2013), 447. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Dunning and Hudson, "Transportation of Irish Swordsmen," 448. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. "Irish Levies for Swedish Service," 305-306. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 75 [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Bussow, *Disturbed State*, 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Bussow, *Disturbed State*, 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 120 [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Chamberlain, "relation de servitio," 121 [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Thomas Chamberlain, " Thomas Chamberlain ad Robertum Cecil de regis Poloniae a Smolensk Wilnam regressu; offìcia propria commendat," *EFE*, 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. John Merrick, "Dzh. Merriku v Angliyu s izlozheniyem sobytiy v Rossii," in *Sostoyaniye Rossiyskoy Imperii ZH. Marzheret v dokumentakh i issledovaniyakh (Teksty,kommentarii, stat'i),* ed. An. Berelovicha, V. D. Nazarova, chl.-korr. Ran P. YU. Uvarova (Moscow: Yazyki Slavanskikh Kul'tur, 2007), 330. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Eva Rachele Sanders and Margaret W. Ferguson "Literacies in Early Modern England," *Critical Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2002), 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Bussow, *Disturbed State*, 54 [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Ailes, *Military Migration*, 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Maija Jansson and Nikolai Rogozhin, ed, *England and the North: The Russian Embassy of 1613-1614,* trans*.* Paul Bushkovitch (American Philosophical Society: Philadelphia, 1994), 76, 77 [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. A Francis Steuart, *Scottish influences in Russian history, from the end of the 16th century to the beginning of the 19th century* (Glasgow: J. Maclehose and sons, 1913), 21 [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Conrad Bussow, himself a German, also sometimes uses the term "German" in instances when other sources make it clear that the soldiers in question were British or French. Bussow, *Disturbed State*, 125. This is perhaps understandable in that Bussow was not an eye-witness to many of the events he describes, and so his sources may have used the term German for the soldiers, which he repeated in his work. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. "Étrangers." la Ville, *Discours Sommaires*, 12, 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Margeret, *Russian Empire*, 76, 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Horsey, "Travels," 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Yuval Noah Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoirs,* 182-183. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, 236-237. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Parrott, *Warriors for a Living*, 308-309; Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, 254-255. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, 238. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 132; Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. la Ville, *Discours Sommaires*, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 79 [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Bussow, *Disturbed State*, 40; Massa, *Short History*, 83 [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Żołkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 61 [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Libiszowska, "Les Français en Pologne," 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Skrynnikov, *Time of Troubles*, 291. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Zolkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Zolkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Zolkiewski, *Expedition to Moscow*, 85; Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Nixon, "Swethland and Poland Warres," 129; Chamberlain, "relation de servitio," 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Zolkiewski, *Expedition to* *Moscow, 75.* [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Isaac Massa*, Massa's Short History of the Muscovite Wars*, trans. G. Edward Orchard (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1982), 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Margeret, *Russian Empire*, 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Ciarán Óg O'Reilly, "Irish Mercenary Tradition,"390. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Dunning and Hudson, "Transportation of Irish Swordsmen," 450. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Dunning and Hudson, "Transportation of Irish Swordsmen," 451. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. "voulant préférer mon honneur et la foy promise à l’Empereur Sousky aux promesses des Polonois." la Ville, *Discours Sommaires*, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Nozdrin "Flodorf Project," 115 [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. *England and the North*, 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Quoted in Oleg J. Nozdrin, "The Autumn of the Captain: Jacques Margeret's Last Mission," [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Nozdrin, "Flodorf Project," 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Stanislaw Zolkiewski, "Sur la Bataille de Klouchino," trans. Prosper Mérimée, in *Oeuvres Complètes Section III Histoire Tome 3: Histoire de Russie, I: Les Faux Démétrius*, by Prosper Mérimée (Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 2012), 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Zolkiewski, *Mission to Moscow*, 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Patrick Gordon, "de audientia sibi a rege Poloniae concessa, de rebus Mosooviae aliisque," in *EFE*, 126 [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Nozdrin, "Autumn of the Captain," 507. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Quoted in Nozdrin, "Autumn of the Captain," 507. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Anita Gilman Sherman, "Poland in the Cultural Imaginary of Early Modern England," *The Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2015), 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Margeret, *Russian Empire*, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. George Turbeville, "Verse Letters from Russia," in *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom*, ed. Lloyd E. Berry and Robert O. Crummey (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1968), 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Giles Fletcher, "Of the Russe Commonwealth," in *Rude and Barbarous Kingdom*, ed. Lloyd E. Berry and Robert O. Crummey (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1968), 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. *Oxford* *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. "Cecil, Robert, first earl of Salisbury," by Pauline Croft. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Thomas Chamberlain, "Propositione of the Moscovits, to render them subiects to the Kinge of England," in Inna Lubimenko, "Project for the Acquisition of Russia by James I" *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 29, No. 114 (Apr. 1914): 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Chamberlain, "Propositione of the Moscovits," 253 [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Jacques Margeret, "Translation of S.P. 9I/I,ff 220-2I," trans. Chester S. L. Dunning, in Chester S. L. Dunning ,"A Letter to James I Concerning The English Plan for Military Intervention in Russia," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Jan., 1989): 104 [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Margeret, "Translation of S.P. 9I/I,ff 220-2I," 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Chester Dunning, "Introduction," in Margeret, *Russian Empire*, xii. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Margeret, *Russian Empire*, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Margeret, *Russian Empire*, 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Ailes, *Military Migration*, x. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. See above, page 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Montmitonnet,,"Les de la Gardie," 339. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Quoted in Nozdrin, "Autumn of the Captain," 511. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Horsey, "Travels," 289. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Bussow, *Disturbed State*, 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Bajer, *Scots in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth*, 337-339. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Anabaptists, Uniates, Eastern Orthodox, Jews, Karaites, and Muslims all lived within the expansive bounds of the Commonwealth. See David Frick, *Kith, Kin, and Neighbors: Communities and Confessions in Seventeenth-Century Wilno* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013) for an account of the most religiously diverse city in the Commonwealth, which featured adherents to all these faiths. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Quoted in Dunning and Hudson, "Transportation of Irish Swordsmen," 424. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. John Davys, "Sir John Davys to Salisbury," *CSPI 3*, 300. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Chamberlain, "relatio de servitio," 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)